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The global financial crisis of 2007–09 has illustrated the 
importance of including funding liquidity feedbacks in any model 
of systemic risk. This paper illustrates how we have incorporated 
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vulnerabilities. The model focuses on the health of core banks in 
the U.K. financial system. For these banks, the model provides a 
coherent quantitative framework for assessing how shocks transmit 
through balance sheets, allowing for macro-credit risk, interest and 
noninterest income risk, network interactions, and feedback effects 
arising on both the asset and liability side of the balance sheet. 
Systemic risks stem from the connectivity of bank balance sheets 
via interbank exposures (counterparty risk); the interaction between 
balance sheets and asset prices (fire-sale effects); and confidence 
effects that may affect funding conditions.
Central banks and regulators are increasingly seeking to use 
formal models to support their financial stability work, and various 
approaches have emerged in recent years (Jenkinson, 2007). Senior 
policymakers at the Bank of England have for some time expressed 
a desire for an integrated approach to assessing systemic risk 
(Gieve, 2006). Gai and Haldane (2007) provide motivation for a 
new approach that emphasizes the importance of distinguishing 
probability and impact when conducting risk assessment work, 
and the Bank of England’s preliminary implementation of such a 
framework is discussed by Haldane, Hall, and Pezzini (2007).
RAMSI aims to deliver a suite of models that should support 
a substantial enhancement in the Bank of England’s ability to 
conduct risk assessment in a rigorous and consistent quantitative 
framework,  thus  helping  to  sharpen  the  analysis  of  key 
vulnerabilities and to improve the Bank’s capability to influence and 
strengthen the management of these risks. Internally, RAMSI will 
support discussions of key risks on a bank-by-bank and systemwide 
basis, and it will facilitate examining the impact of various policy 
measures. Externally, the outputs from the suite of models will 
be a source for communicating risk assessment messages to risk 
managers in the financial sector, thereby helping shape their 
attitudes toward risk. 
The analytical foundations of RAMSI draw, in particular, 
on two strands of literature. First, it employs elements of the 
traditional stress-testing literature, which tend to focus on 
credit risk on a bank’s balance sheet (see Foglia, 2009; Borio and 
Drehmann, in this volume). Second, it draws on recent theoretical 
work on modeling systemic financial crises. Allen and Gale 
(2000) explore the spread of contagion in a banking network, and 
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the network is amplified by asset price effects. Gai and Kapadia 
(2010; in this volume) examine the nonlinearities implied by these 
externalities and suggest that financial innovation may have 
increased the severity of crises.1 
The modular approach involves feeding shocks and scenarios 
from a macroeconomic model through several distinct balance-sheet-
based models that describe how risk profiles evolve throughout 
banks’ business operations. It is influenced by the framework 
developed by the National Bank of Austria (Boss and others, 2006) 
for the Austrian banking system (see also Elsinger, Lehar, and 
Summer, 2006a), which integrates balance-sheet-based models 
of credit and market risk with a network model to evaluate the 
probability of bank default. In presenting a prototype version of 
RAMSI, Alessandri and others (2009) extended and developed the 
single-period Austrian model in a number of dimensions. In a multi-
period setting, they incorporated net interest income and feedback 
effects associated with asset fire sales following bank default. 
This paper extends the RAMSI prototype in several ways, 
including the use of richer balance sheets, a more powerful 
macroeconomic model, better modeling of credit risk, and a model 
of noninterest (nontrading) income. The main innovation, however, 
relates to the role of liability-side feedbacks. We develop a two-
pronged framework for modeling funding liquidity risk. In the 
first stage, we apply an empirical model to project individual bank 
ratings, and we then use the results to calibrate how funding costs 
may rise as a bank’s position worsens. In the second stage, we 
calibrate the onset of funding crises and outright closure of funding 
markets to particular institutions based on a series of indicators. 
To inform our analysis, we draw on theoretical models, information 
from banks’ own liquidity policies, and evidence both from past 
episodes of funding stress and from recent experience, including 
the failure of Northern Rock. 
RAMSI’s framework is particularly attractive to central banks 
because of its storytelling capacity. Alternative approaches to the 
analysis of systemic risk offer particular strengths, either in terms 
of micro-foundations or in terms of consistency with market-based 
1. This result is reinforced by Gai and others (2008), who demonstrate how financial 
innovation and macroeconomic stability may have intensified the robust-yet-fragile 
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pricing of risk.2 Although RAMSI’s framework relies on reduced-
form estimation and behavioral rules of thumb, it offers a flexible 
and operational means of capturing a wide range of risks and 
transmission channels, and it allows for a more articulated analysis 
and interpretation of the outputs of stress-testing exercises. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the 
current components of RAMSI and explains how they fit together. 
Section 2 discusses the aggregate distributions obtained from 
stochastic simulation and conducts a detailed analysis of a particular 
realization in which funding liquidity feedbacks contribute to 
systemwide stress. Section 3 discusses how RAMSI will improve the 
quality of risk assessment work, and section 4 concludes. 
1. The moDeling fRamewoRk
Figure 1 illustrates the modular structure of RAMSI and the 
mapping from shocks to systemic risk. The transmission dynamics 
hinge crucially on two factors—the nature and scale of shocks and 
the structural characteristics of the financial system. In such an 
environment, balance sheet interdependencies and asset- and liability-
side feedbacks make for complex, nonlinear behavior. RAMSI produces 
asset distributions for individual banks and for the aggregate banking 
system by linking together the shaded modules presented in figure 
1. The unshaded module (that is, feedbacks to the macroeconomy) is 
mentioned briefly in the conclusion, but it is mainly left for future 
work. In what follows, we discuss the overall modeling strategy in 
RAMSI before briefly discussing each of its components. 
At the core of RAMSI are detailed end-2007 balance sheets of the 
ten largest U.K. banks.3 These link the modules to the structure of 
2. For example, Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2006) provide a general 
equilibrium framework, but the model is stylized and difficult to operationalize. The 
asset pricing approach, in turn, extracts risk from observed security prices. This 
approach can be applied to individual banks (Segoviano and Padilla, 2006; Elsinger, 
Lehar, and Summer, 2006b; Frisell and others, 2007) or to sectors of the economy 
(Gray, Merton, and Bodie, 2007). These models provide timely updates to banks’ risk 
profiles, albeit on the basis of strong assumptions on market completeness and efficiency. 
Furthermore, market prices may embed the possibility of official support, so the asset 
pricing approach may be unable to identify the extent to which intervention helps to 
mitigate systemic risks (Birchler and Facchinetti, 2007).
3. Membership of the major U.K. banks group is based on the provision of customer 
services in the United Kingdom, regardless of country of ownership. At year-end 2007, 
the members were Alliance and Leicester, Banco Santander, Barclays, Bradford and 
Bingley, Halifax Bank of Scotland, HSBC, Lloyds TSB, Nationwide, Northern Rock, 
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individual U.K. banks. The balance sheets are highly disaggregated, 
with approximately 650 balance sheet entries (including 400 asset 
classes and 250 liability classes). Each of the asset and liability classes 
are further disaggregated into five maturity buckets and six repricing 
buckets.4 Data are mainly extracted from regulatory accounts but are 
supplemented from regulatory returns. This modeling of individual 
bank balance sheets supports an analytically rich model and allows 
us to examine, in detail, the likely sources of profits and losses on a 
disaggregated and aggregated basis. Not all of the balance sheet entries 
are available, so we use rules of thumb based on other information or 
extrapolations on the basis of our knowledge of similarities between 
banks to fill in the data gaps. Much of the granularity arises from 
decomposition of the trading book and available for sale (AFS) 
assets. Since the focus of this paper is on the role of funding liquidity 
risk, we do not model these exposures here. However, this part of the 
balance sheet has played an important role in the ongoing financial 
crisis, and we believe that no systemic risk model can credibly ignore 
it. Trading book and AFS models are currently under development 
and will be introduced in the next version of RAMSI.
4. We do not have six repricing buckets for each of the five maturity buckets.
Figure 1. RAMSI Framework
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The model is run over a three year horizon, which is sufficient 
time for some adverse shocks to be reflected in credit losses (Bunn, 
Cunningham, and Drehmann, 2005; DNB, 2006) and is consistent 
with the horizon central banks often use when stress testing their 
financial systems (Hagen and others, 2005; Bank of England, 2007; 
Sveriges Riksbank, 2007). The sequence of events is illustrated 
in figure 2. Outcomes from a macroeconomic model determine a 
yield curve and probabilities of default and loss-given default on 
banks’ credit exposures. For each combination of risk factors, we 
model the first-round effects on each bank, with distinct modules 
accounting for credit losses, net interest income, other income, and 
operating expenses.
Figure 2. Model Dynamicsa
Source: Authors’ drawing.
a. The trading book and available-for-sale (AFS) assets are not included in this version of RAMSI.
If  a  bank’s  fundamentals  deteriorate,  its  rating  may  be 
downgraded,  increasing  its  future  funding  costs.  In  severe 
circumstances, funding conditions may deteriorate to such an extent 
that the bank is shut out of short-term funding markets. It then fails, 
triggering a feedback loop. Because of bankruptcy costs, a fraction 
of the failed bank’s assets are lost, reducing the amount available 
to its creditors on the interbank network. Some of the bank’s assets 
are sold at fire-sale prices, creating asset-side feedbacks that cause 
remaining banks to suffer temporary (intraperiod) mark-to-market 
losses. Funding markets suffer confidence contagion that makes 
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to being shut out of funding markets. If a further bank fails after 
we account for the second-round effects, then the loop repeats until 
the default cascade ends.
In the absence of bank failures (or after the feedback loop has 
completed), we update the balance sheets of surviving banks using a 
rule of thumb for reinvestment behavior. Banks target prespecified 
Tier 1 capital ratios, and they invest in assets and increase liabilities 
in proportion to their shares on their initial balance sheet. 
Throughout the paper, we assume that there is no regulatory 
or other policy intervention, aside from the interest rate response 
that is endogenous to the macroeconomic model. This is partly 
because modeling the policy reaction to extreme events is inherently 
difficult, especially given that there is no single, standard response 
to financial crises. The model therefore provides an assessment of 
how the financial system would fare without any policy response. 
This allows for judgements to be drawn on the potential benefits 
and costs of intervening.
1.1 The Macroeconomic Model
The link between the macroeconomy and the various risks on 
banks’ balance sheets is central to RAMSI. We use a large-scale 
Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) to capture the evolution of 
macroeconomic and financial variables. The BVAR is the only source 
of shocks in RAMSI, thereby preserving a one-for-one mapping from 
macroeconomic variables to default risk, which is useful for story-
telling purposes.5 
The BVAR is estimated on quarterly data over the sample period 
from the second quarter of 1972 to the fourth quarter of 2007. The 
model includes 24 domestic and foreign (U.S. and E.U.) variables 
(see table 1) and has two lags. We use quarterly growth rates of all 
variables, barring those denoted with an asterisk. The resulting 
vector of time series variables to be modeled therefore contains a 
mixture of levels and growth rates, including the quarterly growth of 
gross domestic product (GDP), the level of the three-month Treasury 
bill rate, and so on. Our prior treats every variable in the system as a 
white noise process centered around a constant. This is a special case 
of the Minnesota prior popularized by Litterman (1986): essentially, 
5.  Stress  scenarios  can  be  used  to  determine  the  impact  of  adjusting 
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we adapt the standard Minnesota prior to the case where all unit 
roots have been eliminated by data transformations.6 
The BVAR performs well according to the usual diagnostics. 
First, it has reasonable in-sample fit, capturing much of the 
variation over time in most series (the average R squared across 
the 24 equations was 66 percent). The equations for asset prices had 
the poorest fit, including equities, the sterling exchange rate index 
(ERI), and particularly oil prices (R squared of 12 percent). Second, 
the forecasts are, for the most part, reasonable: most variables are 
projected to either regress back to their average historical growth 
rates or to gradually converge on their sample means. Third, the 
model also produces reasonable impulse responses following shocks 
to U.K. GDP, U.K. three-month interest rates, U.K. house prices, 
and real oil prices. 
6. In a Bayesian context, all parameters are treated as random variables and the 
data are used to estimate their probability distribution rather than to obtain point 
estimates. We abstract from model uncertainty and use the means of the estimated 
posterior parameter distributions.




In quarterly  
growth rates In levels
United Kingdom Real GDP Three-month Treasury bill rate
CPI inflation Three-year government bond rate
£ERI Ten-year government bond rate
Real FTSE index, all shares Unemployment
Real house prices Income gearing
Real commercial prop. prices Corporate lending 
Three-month LIBOR spread
Ten-year corporate spread 
United States Real GDP Three-month Treasury bill rate
CPI  Three-year government bond rate
Euro area Real GDP Three-month Treasury bill rate
CPI  Three-year government bond rate
World Real oil prices
Real world equity prices
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For simplicity, we approximate the yield curve by linearly 
interpolating the short- and long-term interest rates implied by the 
BVAR (two for the United Kingdom and one each for the euro area 
and the United States). This is the source of all risk-free rates used 
in the model. Finally, since the BVAR does not forecast the spread 
on the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) particularly well, we 
currently assume that it evolves according to the path implied by 
forward spreads.
1.2 First-Round Impact on Banks
In this section we assess the first-round impact of shocks on 
banks, before the impact of any systemic interactions. 
1.2.1 Credit risk
The credit risk module treats aggregate default probabilities (PDs) 
and loss given default (LGD) as a function of the macroeconomic and 
financial variables from the BVAR. Credit losses are derived as the 
product of the relevant aggregate PD times LGD times each bank’s 
total exposure to the sector.7 We adjust the aggregate write-off rate 
for each bank to account for heterogeneity in the riskiness of banks’ 
portfolios.8 We model credit losses arising from exposure to U.K. 
households (through mortgages, credit cards, and other unsecured 
borrowing), U.K. corporates, plus households and corporates in the 
United States, the euro area and the rest of the world.9 For brevity, 
we only report results for U.K. mortgages and corporate loans.
Basing the model on Whitley, Windram, and Cox (2004), we relate 
the PD on a representative pool of mortgages to the unemployment 
rate, the level of income gearing (that is, interest payments relative 
to disposable income), and undrawn equity in housing stock (that 
is, the residual proportion of housing wealth net of the stock of 
7. That is, we model expected credit losses and trace out variation in expected 
credit losses driven by macroeconomic fundamentals. 
8. These adjustments are made on the basis of historical differences between the 
write-off rates of individual banks and aggregate write-off rates. This implies that a 
relatively safer bank continues to incur lower credit losses than the typical bank.
9. Data availability poses a major challenge. It would be desirable to capture sectoral 
concentrations and lumpiness in corporate exposures by modeling a finer breakdown 
of exposures (such as commercial property lending). Currently, our assumption is that 
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mortgage debt). Our dependent variable is the fraction of borrowers 
who are three months or more in arrears. We model arrears as they 
provide a forward-looking indicator of actual defaults. We estimate a 
transition rate based on the average historical relationship between 
these variables. The model is estimated on a sample running from 
the early 1980s, reflecting the structural change in retail credit 
markets following the removal of direct controls on bank lending in 
1980 (the so-called corset). The LGD on this pool is assumed to be 
driven by residential property prices.
Our preferred model of the corporate liquidations rate is driven by 
real output growth, the real (ex post) cost of borrowing, commercial 
property prices, and a measure of the cyclical variation in corporate 
debt (based on Vlieghe, 2001). The LGD on a corporate loan is 
assumed to depend on the value of commercial property prices.
The estimated coefficients in both equations are all signed 
according to our priors. Both models capture the broad movements in 
the data reasonably well, but there are clear areas for improvement. 
The mortgage arrears equation, for instance, only accounts for around 
half of the pick up in arrears in the early 1990s, and the performance 
of the corporate PD equation deteriorates from 2002 onwards.10
1.2.2 Net interest income
For  most  of  the  loan  book,  interest  income  is  modeled 
endogenously. Banks price their loans on the basis of the prevailing 
yield curve and the perceived riskiness of their debtors: an increase 
in actual or expected credit risk translates into a higher cost of 
borrowing. However, banks’ repricing ability is constrained by the 
maturity structure of their balance sheets. Since assets and liabilities 
typically do not have matched maturities, these constraints generate 
significant income risk. The possibility of shifts in the yield curve 
intensifies this risk.
We use the risk-neutral asset pricing model of Drehmann, 
Sorensen, and Stringa (2008) to consistently capture both sources 
of income risk. Consider a risky asset, A, with a repricing maturity 
equal to T, implying that the asset pays a fixed coupon C over the next 
10. Possible explanations include the (until recently) prolonged stability of the 
macroeconomy; the cleansing effect of earlier recessions; legislative changes (namely, 
the 2000 Insolvency Act and the 2002 Enterprise Act); and (until recently) the easy 
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T periods. The economic value of the asset today is the risk-adjusted 
discounted value of future coupon payments and the principal:
EV A DCA D A t T
t
T
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where the discount factors are given by
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and where rl – 1,l, PDl – 1,l, and LGDl – 1,l represent, respectively, the 
forward risk-free interest rate, expected PD, and expected LGD 
between time l – 1 and l.11 We can use the first equation to calculate 














Whenever the bank can update C (that is, at time T, 2T,...), 
it will do so using the equation above, so that expected interest 
income covers expected losses and book and economic value coincide. 
Between 0 and T, though, interest rates, PDs, and LGDs may change, 
whereas the coupon is fixed: any change in discount factors that is 
unexpected as of time zero will thus prevent the zero-profit condition 
from holding. For each bank, we use balance sheet information to 
determine the fraction of assets and liabilities that can be repriced 
at any point in time. The model implies that the pricing structure 
of the balance sheet—particularly the mismatch between assets 
and liabilities—influences a bank’s vulnerability to interest rate 
and PD shocks.
11. The risk-free yield curve is known at the time of pricing; we assume that banks 
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The model-implied coupons are calibrated to better accord 
with actual observed spreads, as these may also partly reflect 
compensation for fixed costs associated with arranging loans and 
oligopolistic profits derived by banks. In particular, for household 
and nonfinancial sector corporate assets, the model-implied coupon 
is increased by 50 basis points.
For other parts of the balance sheet, including all of the liability 
side, we simply calibrate spreads based on market rates and other 
data. For example, we assume that interbank assets and liabilities 
receive or pay the risk-free rate plus the LIBOR spread, while 
banks pay negative spreads relative to the risk-free rate on some 
household and corporate deposits (if the negative spread implies 
a negative interest rate, the interest rate paid is assumed to be 
zero). As discussed below, spreads on certain liability classes may 
also depend on the rating of the bank in question.
1.2.3 Noninterest (nontrading) income and operating 
expenses
Noninterest, nontrading income (henceforth noninterest income) 
was just under half of U.K. banks’ operating income in 2007.12 It 
includes fees and commissions (see table 2). Stiroh (2004) finds 
noninterest income to be procyclical, which appears plausible 
given that its components include securitizations. Bank-specific 
and structural determinants may also be important. The rise in 
the share of noninterest income may be seen in the context of new 
technologies (such as internet fees), financial derivatives, loan 
securitizations, and the sale of back-up lines of credit. Capital is 
not required for many such fee-based activities, even though some, 
such as derivatives and trust services, take place on balance sheet, 
so increased reliance on noninterest income could be associated 
with higher leverage (DeYoung and Rice, 2004). 
 
12. One reason for separating the modeling of trading income from that of the 
other components of noninterest income is that trading income is the most volatile. It 
contributes to a large part of the variance of total noninterest income, which itself has 
increasingly contributed to the variance of overall operating income growth. Stiroh 
(2004) shows that for U.S. banks, the noninterest income contributed 80 percent of the 
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Table 2. U.S. and U.K. Noninterest Income and Expensesa 
Ratio of operating income
United States 1984–89 1990–99 2000–07
Net interest income 0.72 0.64 0.57
Noninterest income 0.28 0.36 0.43
Fiduciary 0.05 0.05 0.05
Service charge 0.06 0.07 0.07
Trading  0.02 0.03 0.03
Other 0.15 0.21 0.27
Noninterest expenditure 0.68 0.64 0.59
Noninterest, nontrading income 0.26 0.33 0.40
United Kingdomb 1997–2003 2004–06 2007 interim
Net interest income 0.58 0.42 0.39
Noninterest income 0.43 0.58 0.61
Net fees and commissions 0.27 0.20 0.21
Dividend income 0.003 0.004 0.005
Dealing profits 0.05 0.11 0.13
Other 0.10 0.27 0.26
Noninterest expenditure 0.56 0.62 0.59
Noninterest, nontrading income 0.38 0.47 0.48
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The components of noninterest income are not directly comparable between the United States and the United 
Kingdom. For example, fees and commissions are included in other noninterest income in the United States. 
b. In the United Kingdom, the change to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2004 boosted 
the share of insurance income. For example, Lloyds TSB’s noninterest income as a share of its operating income 
jumped from 47 percent in 2003 to 74 percent in 2004.
Data paucity and inconsistencies rule out estimation based on 
U.K. data, so we instead use U.S. data (see table 2). This seems 
reasonable given the similarities between the United Kingdom 
and the United States and, in particular, the similar shares of 
noninterest income in operating income (around 42 percent for U.K. 
banks and 38 percent for U.S. banks). As in Stiroh (2004), we use 
aggregate quarterly U.S. data that covers over 7,000 FDIC-insured 
commercial banks in the period from the first quarter of 1984 to the 
third quarter of 2007. The use of aggregate data prohibits a search 
for bank-specific effects.
The results for the favored equation are shown below. As in 
Stiroh (2004), noninterest income is quite strongly procyclical. A 
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that real noninterest income rises by 2.7 percentage points initially 
and 2.0 percentage points eventually.13 We find insufficiently strong 
evidence for factors such as balance sheet asset growth, equity 
returns, and equity volatility to include them in RAMSI. However, 
some specifications (not shown) provided evidence that noninterest 
income increases with leverage and decreases with the slope of the 
yield curve. 
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where the joint significance of GDP and lagged GDP (p value) is 0.004 
and the adjusted R squared is 0.18, based on 90 observations.
We validate the U.S.-based model on U.K. data by checking its 
forecasting performance. We generate noninterest income forecasts 
for each U.K. bank based on its initial level and increase that with 
the predicted values of real noninterest income growth from the 
estimated equation. When calibrated to U.K. banks, the out-of-
sample forecasting performance is satisfactory. Between 2005 and 
2007, the model predicts a 16.5 percent increase over the two years, 
compared with an outturn of 16.2 percent.
For noninterest expenses (that is, operating expenses), we suppose 
that banks target cost ratios. This is supported by empirical estimates 
of an equation for noninterest costs based on the same aggregate 
U.S. data that were used to estimate noninterest income. Costs are 
found to be less procyclical than operating income, reflecting the 
proposition that banks are unable to immediately adjust expenses. 
The equation for operating expenses is
13. We also tried an error correction mechanism specification in an attempt to identify 
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where the adjusted R squared is 0.86, based on 94 observations.
1.2.4 Profits, Taxes, and Dividends
To generate plausible profit figures, we assume that each bank 
earns a trading income that is proportional to the size of its portfolio, 
using 2007 data to calibrate the ratio. This assumption will obviously 
become redundant when we introduce trading book and AFS models. 
Profits are then computed as the sum of all sources of income, net 
of expenses and credit losses. We deduct taxes and dividends from 
profits, assuming that the tax rate and ratio of dividends to profits 
are in line with recent history.
Profits (or losses) after taxes and dividends are assumed to 
increase (or erode) Tier 1 capital directly. Updated Tier 1 capital ratios 
may then be computed by dividing capital by risk-weighted assets, 
where the latter are computed by applying Basel II standardized 
risk weights or approximations to them when we have insufficient 
information (such as corporate loans, for which we do not know the 
ratings of the borrowers). 
1.3 Funding Liquidity Risk and Bank Failure
The ongoing credit crisis has illustrated starkly how increased 
funding costs and the closure of funding markets can trigger bank 
failure. We have integrated two complementary channels to capture 
funding liquidity effects. First, we apply an empirical model to 
project individual bank ratings and use the results to calibrate how 
funding costs may change with the fundamentals of a bank. Second, 
we use a separate danger zone model in which a range of indicators 
determine whether a bank suffers stress so severe that it is shut out 
of unsecured funding markets. 
We consider it important to model the outright closure of funding 
markets in a distinct framework. Figure 3 illustrate this point. 
Though there may be a relatively linear relationship between a 
deterioration in bank fundamentals and increased funding costs in 386 Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison
relatively normal times, it is hard to use this approach to identify 
the closure of funding markets in extreme circumstances, given that 
this is an inherently nonlinear process and could occur at different 
ratings and funding costs (A or B), depending on the circumstances. 
We thus feel that the danger zone approach is more appropriate for 
identifying the region in which funding markets are likely to shut. 
Nevertheless, we intend to use the funding cost or ratings model as 
a cross-check on the danger zone approach. 
Figure 3. The Operation of Funding Liquidity Risk
Source: Authors’ drawing.
1.3.1 Bank ratings and funding costs
We model banks’ funding costs in two stages. First, we use an 
ordered probit model (adapted from Pagratis and Stringa, 2008) 
to examine the sensitivity of Moody’s senior (long-term) unsecured 
ratings to a number of key bank performance indicators and 
macroeconomic variables. The index produces ratings for each 
bank at each quarter using the estimated coefficients from table 3. 
Ratings are found to improve under the following conditions: 
(i) when profitability increases; (ii) when the ratio of (illiquid) 
customer loans to short-term liabilities is relatively low; (iii) when 
the bank has a relatively high market share of lending; (iv) when 
cost efficiency (proxied by operating expenses/total assets) is high; 
(v) when asset quality (proxied by credit losses/net interest income) 
is high; (vi) when economy-wide output and credit rise above trend 
and the yield curve steepens. 387 Funding Liquidity Risk in a Quantitative Model of Systemic Stability
The assigned ratings are mapped to credit spreads using Merrill 
Lynch’s bond indices of U.K. sterling bond spreads associated with 
different credit ratings. These bank-specific spreads are applied to 
certain types of wholesale funding (including interbank and other 
nonretail deposits, commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and 
subordinated debt). This introduces a key feedback mechanism on 
the liability side of balance sheets: if a bank gets downgraded, the 
associated rise in its funding costs will reduce its future profitability, 
leaving it more vulnerable to future downgrades and, ultimately, to 
a loss of access to wholesale funding markets.
1.3.2 Modeling the closure of funding markets: A danger 
zone approach
Modeling the outright closure of funding markets presents 
significant challenges, both because of the binary, nonlinear nature 
of liquidity risk and because—notwithstanding recent events—
liquidity crises in developed countries are rare events for which 
data are limited. We therefore adopt a simple, transparent (yet 
subjective) danger zone approach, under which banks accumulate 
points as liquidity conditions deteriorate and face the prospect that 
certain funding markets may close to them as their score crosses 
particular thresholds.
Figure 4 gives an overview of the approach. Outputs from the 
rest of the model are mapped into specific indicators of funding 
stress relating to three key areas that theoretical models (such 
as Chen, 1999, and Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005) and evidence 
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from case studies and banks’ own liquidity policies suggest are 
important: namely, solvency, liquidity, and confidence. The 
framework allows for feedback effects. In particular, the closure 
of certain funding markets to an institution may worsen that 
bank’s liquidity position through snowball effects, whereby the 
bank becomes increasingly reliant on short-term funding, and 
may adversely affect similar banks through a pure confidence 
channel. Recent events highlight how marketwide liquidity factors 
can also play an important role by affecting confidence and thus 
contributing to funding stress. To proxy for these factors, the 
framework captures a greater risk of funding stress in periods 
when the market interbank spread is elevated. 
Figure 5 presents the set of eight indicators (with the underlying 
factor that each is trying to proxy in brackets), along with the 
aggregation scheme and the thresholds at which short- and long-term 
unsecured funding markets are assumed to close to the bank.14 In 
constructing the weighting, we place roughly equal weight on three 
main factors that can trigger a funding crises: (i) concerns about 
future solvency; (ii) a weak liquidity position or funding structure (for 
example, a high reliance on short-term wholesale unsecured funding); 
and (iii) institution-specific and marketwide confidence effects, over 
and above those generated by solvency concerns or weaknesses in 
liquidity positions. In the aggregation, we allow for the possibility 
that a run could be triggered either by extreme scores in any of 
the three areas or by a combination of moderate scores across the 
different areas. The judgments underpinning more specific aspects 
of the calibration and weighting schemes were informed by analysis 
of a range of case studies.15
Currently, the danger zones are incorporated into RAMSI in a 
simplified way. Since the model does not yet include model-consistent 
expectations, the current Tier 1 capital ratio is used instead of the 
expected ratio and the past profitability indicator is ignored, as it 
is not possible to identify unanticipated losses. The threshold at 25 
14. Secured funding markets are discussed below. For simplicity, we do not consider 
a more detailed breakdown of funding markets (for example, we do not distinguish 
between foreign and domestic funding markets).
15. The case studies (still work in progress) include both episodes in which banks 
have failed (such as Franklin National Bank, Continental Illinois, Japanese banks, 
and Northern Rock) and episodes in which banks have survived (including Lehman 
Brothers during the LTCM crisis, Countrywide, and Société Générale following the 
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points is also ignored, and banks are simply assumed to default if 
their danger zone score reaches 35 and short-term secured markets 
close to them. When fully incorporated, a score of 25 or more will 
trigger the closure of long-term unsecured funding markets to the 
bank, which will be able to refinance in short-term unsecured funding 
markets or take other defensive actions such as selling or repoing 
assets. There will be no default at this point, but there will be a 
snowball effect, whereby the increased reliance on short-term funds 
will affect the bank’s score on the maturity mismatch indicator.
The full danger zone framework will also allow for a number of 
extensions. First, there will be a gradual outflow of retail deposits 
after long-term unsecured funding markets close to the bank, such 
that the outflow reaches 5 percent of retail deposits by the time short-
term unsecured markets close. This is intended to reflect behavior of 
well-informed investors rather than a widespread run (like Northern 
Rock). Second, we intend to define banks scoring less than five points 
as safe and allow them to receive funding withdrawn from troubled 
banks; as such, they will help to close the system by capturing 
flight-to-quality effects. If there are no safe banks, we will assume 
funds end up as increased reserves at the central bank. Finally, we 
plan to extend the framework to cover secured funding markets. For 
Figure 5. Danger Zones: Basic Structure
Source: Authors’ drawing.392 Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison
these, we will assume that if a bank cannot repo assets, it will be 
able to sell them at the prevailing market price. Critically, however, 
this could be a fire-sale price and, in some instances, could even be 
zero, either because there are no buyers in the market or because 
of potential stigma effects that could be generated by a large asset 
sale in an illiquid market. The framework will thus highlight the 
importance of collateral quality in determining how a bank fares if 
secured funding markets close to it.
1.3.3 Example of a danger zone calibration: Continental 
Illinois
Case studies indicate that the danger zone approach performs 
relatively well, especially in terms of capturing the ranking of 
institutions that are under the most stress. We have considered 
case studies beyond the very recent crisis. An example is the case of 
Continental Illinois, which can be divided into two periods, at least 
in terms of funding liquidity pressure: the closure to it of longer-term 
domestic funding markets in July 1982 and the global run in May 
1984. Figure 6 scores Continental Illinois in each of these periods. 
Figure 6. Continental Illinois Danger Zone Points
Source: Authors’ calculations.393 Funding Liquidity Risk in a Quantitative Model of Systemic Stability
Continental scores heavily on the market funds reliance 
indicator, but solvency concerns also played a crucial role. In 
particular, the July 1982 run may be identified with mild concerns 
over future solvency stemming from anticipated losses on risky 
speculative loans to the energy sector. Many of these loans had 
been originated by Penn Square, a much smaller bank that failed 
earlier that month.
Aside from raising solvency concerns, Continental scores points 
following Penn Square’s failure both because of its similarity and 
because of a significant unanticipated loss from a direct exposure. 
Overall, Continental scores enough points for the first danger zone 
threshold to be crossed. Increased reliance on short-term funding 
then serves to increase Continental’s score over the next couple 
of years. The final trigger for the second run is the fallout from 
the Latin American debt crisis—which substantially raised future 
solvency concerns during the first part of 1984 so that by May, 
Continental exceeds the second danger zone threshold.
1.3.4 Bank failure and bankruptcy costs
As just discussed, banks are assumed to default if they score 
35 danger zone points and are shut out of short-term unsecured 
funding markets. When a bank defaults, we follow James (1991) 
and suppose that it incurs costs equivalent to 10 percent of its 
remaining assets. This is also in line with the mean figure reported 
in Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006). These bankruptcy costs are designed 
to capture the direct legal, accounting, and redundancy costs that 
are incurred upon default. They may also be viewed as capturing 
the erosion in the real value of a bank’s assets that may occur upon 
default as a result of disruptions to established bank-borrower 
relationships or the loss of human capital. They imply that even if 
banks fail with positive shareholder funds, they will be unable to 
fulfil all of their obligations upon default.
1.4 Second-Round Effects and Contagion
In this section, we assess various channels of systemic feedback 
that occur when a distressed bank fails. These occur on both the 
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1.4.1 Asset-side feedbacks: Fire sales
When a bank is in distress, it may sell assets, opening up the 
possibility of an important feedback channel operating via asset 
prices. In the current version of RAMSI, such fire sales only occur 
after a bank defaults, and not as a defensive action to stave off 
failure. A failing bank is assumed to liquidate all its available-for-
sale (AFS) assets. The fire-sale discount lasts for one quarter, and 
the resulting fall in asset prices may lead other banks to incur mark-
to-market losses; hence in extreme circumstances, these banks may 
then also fail. 
The associated price impact given by equation (4) is applied 
to other banks’ AFS assets. Consistent with Duffie, Gârleanu, 
and Pedersen (2006), we take the relationship between prices and 
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The price of asset j following the fire sale, Pj', is the maximum of 
zero and the price before the fire sale, Pj, multiplied by a discount 
term. The discount term is a function of the value of assets sold by 
bank i in the fire sale, Sij, divided by the depth of the market in 
normal times, Mj, and scaled by a parameter θ that reflects frictions, 
such as search problems, that cause markets to be less than perfectly 
liquid. Market depth can also be shocked by a term εj  to capture 
fluctuations in the depth of markets as macroeconomic conditions 
vary. There are three types of assets that can be affected by fire sales: 
equities, corporate debt securities, and asset- and mortgage-backed 
securities. Each has a different value of market depth. 
Calibration of the parameters is made difficult by the paucity of 
empirical analyses that reveal the price impact for a given volume 
of assets sold in fire sales. Our calibration is guided, in part, by 
Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), who consider a fire sale 
of U.S. convertible bonds by hedge funds in 2005. They estimate 
that 5 percent of the outstanding stock of U.S. convertible bonds 
were sold at a maximum price discount of 2.7 percent. Similarly, 
Coval and Stafford (2007) analyze the price impact of fire sales 
involving U.S. equity mutual funds. They find an average price 395 Funding Liquidity Risk in a Quantitative Model of Systemic Stability
impact of 2.2 percent for the fire sales they identify. Pulvino (1998) 
focuses on fire sales of aircraft and finds larger price impacts for 
these assets. He also finds that the price impact varies when the 
depth of the market fluctuates. However, none of this information 
is sufficient for precise calibration, since it is not possible to make 
a direct comparison of the size of the fire sale in relation to the 
overall market in the study and the potential size in the case of 
any liquidation of U.K. banks’ assets. 
Therefore, the calibration is guided both by this empirical 
evidence and a top-down judgment regarding the plausible impact 
of a fire sale on capital.16 The calibration for θ is based on the results 
presented in Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007). Given θ, a value 
of market depth Mj is chosen for each of the asset types so that when 
the U.K. bank with the largest holdings of an asset class in its trading 
portfolio and AFS assets sells all these assets, it generates prices 
falls of 2 percent for equities, 4 percent for corporate debt, and 5 
percent for asset- and mortgage-backed securities. 
1.4.2 Network model
When a bank defaults, counterparty credit losses incurred by other 
banks are determined using a network model. A matrix of interbank 
exposures for the major U.K. banks, along with some smaller U.K. 
institutions and a selection of large, complex financial institutions 
(LCFIs) is built using reported large exposure data where available. 
Since we also have information on total interbank asset and liability 
positions, we then use maximum entropy techniques to fill in missing 
gaps in the network, ensuring that none of the estimated entries 
exceed the reporting threshold for large exposures.17 If any interbank 
assets or liabilities are unallocated following this procedure, we 
assume that they are associated with a residual sector that cannot 
default. Once constructed, the estimated exposure matrix remains 
static over the forecasting horizon. To clear the network following 
the default of one or more institutions, we use the Eisenberg and 
Noe (2001) algorithm. This both determines contagious defaults and 
returns counterparty credit losses for each institution.
16. The impact is likely to be stronger when the financial system is under stress 
and markets are less deep (Pulvino, 1998). 
17. The techniques adopted are similar to those discussed by Wells (2004), Elsinger, 
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1.4.3 Feedback loop
After accounting for counterparty credit losses and mark-to-market 
losses on AFS assets, we update the danger zone scores for banks that 
survived initially (see figure 2). In the event of another bank breaching 
the 35-point threshold, we iterate around the network and asset-side 
feedback mechanism again. If no banks breach the threshold, we 
update all balance sheets to account for counterparty credit losses. 
However, we assume that asset prices recover to prefeedback levels, so 
mark-to-market losses are not carried forward. This reflects the idea 
that once a crisis has passed, asset prices are likely to return to their 
fundamental values fairly quickly. A more gradual price adjustment 
process would impose higher systemic costs on the banking system, 
and we plan to allow for this in future work.
1.5 Reinvestment
Rules for adjusting balance sheets to account for profits and losses 
are necessary in a multi-period setting. As noted above, profits (or 
losses) after taxes and dividends are assumed to increase (or erode) 
Tier 1 capital. On the asset side, credit losses are simply booked 
against the relevant exposure for the loss. But other profit and 
loss items cannot be linked so directly to particular balance sheet 
lines. Therefore, to rebalance the balance sheet, we adopt a set of 
mechanical reinvestment rules.18 If operating income (which includes 
net interest income, noninterest income, and trading income) exceeds 
operating expenses, then at the point of rebalancing, liabilities plus 
capital will exceed assets, and banks reinvest their surplus funds 
according to the following rules:
—Rule 1: Banks have a bank-specific target Tier 1 capital ratio 
that they aim to meet when investing their funds (and they are not 
permitted to buy back equity to meet their target);
—Rule 2: Subject to rule 1, banks invest in assets in proportion 
to their shares on the bank’s initial balance sheet (for example, 
mortgage banks will, ceteris paribus, invest in mortgage assets 
rather than trading assets);
—Rule 3: Rule 1 determines total assets after reinvestment and 
hence the amount of new liabilities that need to be raised; these 
18. Rules can be respecified in policy experiments (for example, to assess the impact 
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net new liabilities are allocated in proportion to their shares on the 
bank’s initial balance sheet.
In the current version of RAMSI, defensive actions in response 
to declines in capital are very limited. When a bank’s operating 
expenses exceed its operating income (so that assets exceed 
liabilities plus capital at the point of rebalancing), we assume that 
the bank is unable to disinvest or raise capital. Rather, it raises new 
liabilities according to rule 3. The reinvestment rule therefore has 
the benefit of transparently demonstrating the implications of not 
taking mitigating actions in the face of losses. This is not necessarily 
realistic, however. For example, an alternative specification would 
allow banks to disinvest when making losses; this would reduce 
the likelihood of the bank suffering a liquidity crisis, but it would 
introduce a further channel of macroeconomic feedbacks.
The primacy of the Tier 1 capital ratio rule is justifiable, first, 
because five U.K. banks (namely, Barclays, Bradford and Bingley, 
Halifax Bank of Scotland, HSBC, and Royal Bank of Scotland) 
publish a Tier 1 capital ratio target; and, second, because the mean 
ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets for the major U.K. banks was 
relatively stable in recent years (up to 2007) and institution-specific 
standard deviations of this ratio were low. For banks that have not 
published target capital ratios, we assume that they target a capital 
ratio equal to their end-2007 number.
We are motivated to choose neutral assumptions regarding 
portfolio allocation, and the second and third rules are based on 
the presumption that initial balance sheets represent desirable 
equilibrium outcomes that banks seek to preserve in the face of 
changes in size. Drastic changes in portfolio are typically associated 
with a change in the bank’s business model. Within a given business 
model, the rules seem reasonable, especially over the three year 
horizon considered in this paper. 
The portfolio allocation rules are not entirely neutral, however. 
The liability rule precludes banks from responding to changes in 
funding costs. On the asset side, our assumed rule precludes the 
possibility that banks may skew their reinvestment toward areas 
in which they have recently been most profitable, which may 
understate the risk. Following positive macroeconomic outcomes, 
risky assets tend to generate the most profits and increase most 
in value. Risks would therefore accumulate more quickly were 
we to employ an alternative reinvestment rule in which banks 
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on the balance sheet in the most recent period (rather than the 
initial period in our rule). We intend to conduct further validation 
to guide such choices.
There is no leverage target, so our reinvestment rules allow 
leverage to be determined according to developments elsewhere in 
RAMSI. As pointed out by Adrian and Shin (2008), leverage may 
be procyclical when positive macroeconomic outcomes lead to a 
decline in the measured riskiness of banks’ existing assets (such 
as a decline in value at risk or a fall in Basel II risk weights). 
Such procyclicality will be built into RAMSI when we introduce 
endogenous Basel II risk weights that adjust to changes in PDs. 
Conversely, if banks choose to purchase relatively risky assets 
(with high risk weights), then leverage rises relatively less, since 
banks can achieve their Tier 1 capital ratio targets by purchasing 
fewer assets than if they purchase assets with lower or zero risk 
weights, such as government bonds. 
2. simulaTions
We use data up to the fourth quarter of 2007 (so that all balance 
sheet information is on the basis of end-2007 data) and run 500 
simulations on a three-year forecast horizon stretching to the 
end of 2010. The BVAR is currently the only source of exogenous 
randomness in the stochastic simulations; each simulation is 
thus driven by a sequence of macroeconomic shocks drawn from a 
multivariate normal distribution.19 It should be stressed, however, 
that the results are illustrative, reflecting model properties in this 
preliminary version rather than being the authors’ view of likely 
responses of the banks in question.
2.1 Aggregate Results
Throughout this section, we discuss results for the U.K. banking 
system in aggregate. Since individual banks’ balance sheets are at 
the core of RAMSI, the model produces a rich set of information 
and may be used both to obtain baseline projections for specific 
institutions and to analyze their performance under stress. Such 
19. In other words, we draw 500 realizations of the macroeconomic risk factors in 
the first quarter. In subsequent periods, we draw a single set of macroeconomic risk 
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information can be used to assess the vulnerability of particular 
institutions to different risks and may thus feed into the internal 
institution-specific risk assessment work undertaken by regulators 
and central banks.
Figure 7 shows the simulated distributions of some key profit 
and loss items. For each variable, we calculate aggregate cumulative 
figures for the first year by adding over banks and quarters, 
and we normalize by aggregate 2007 capital (that is, by capital 
at the beginning of the period). The vertical line represents the 
corresponding figures from the 2007 published accounts, normalized 
by 2006 capital levels.
Figure 7. Simulated Distributions for Profit and Loss Itemsa 
Percent of aggregate 2007 capital
A. Credit losses B. Net interest income
C. Noninterest income less  
trading income D. Net profit before tax
Source: Authors' calculations.
a. All items are cumulative for the first forecast year.
Panel A shows that credit risk is projected to increase in 2008, 
reflecting a worsening of the macroeconomic outlook. However, since 
our credit risk model abstracts from portfolio concentrations (see 
section 1.3.1), we arguably underestimate the variance of the credit 400 Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison
risk loss distribution. Net interest income is projected to be weaker 
than 2007, reflecting contractual frictions that prevent banks from 
instantaneously passing on higher funding costs to their borrowers. 
The variance of net interest income may be unrealistically high, 
as the model does not incorporate hedging of interest rate risk.20 
Noninterest income (panel C) remains high, with a median 
projection above the reported 2007 level; this variable is procyclical, 
but it adjusts relatively slowly to macroeconomic changes. The net 
impact on banks’ profitability is summarized in the net profit chart 
(panel D). Profits were projected to be weaker than in 2007, and 
there is some evidence of bimodality, insofar as there are a number 
of observations in the extreme tail of the distribution, which are 
typically associated with one or more banks defaulting.
2.2 Dissecting the Tail: The Role of Funding Liquidity 
and Contagion
The crisis afflicting banks in the U.K. and internationally has 
illustrated the importance of funding liquidity. By their nature, the 
aggregate cumulative distributions in figure 7 mask bank-by-bank 
heterogeneity. In bad draws taken from the BVAR, some banks incur 
large losses in some quarters or scenarios, which can erode those 
banks’ Tier 1 capital ratios and increase their danger zone points. 
With some banks scoring points on the liquidity indicators, the 
increased solvency concerns can, in extreme cases, be sufficient for 
a bank’s score to reach 35 points, leading to the closure of short-term 
unsecured funding markets to that institution and its default. Note 
that the introduction of funding liquidity risk into the framework is 
critical here. Looking at capital alone, the defaulting banks remain 
well above the 4 percent regulatory minimum. Nevertheless, a 
combination of mild solvency concerns, a weak liquidity position, 
and elevated market interbank spreads is sufficient for wholesale 
depositors to withdraw funding. 
The crosses in figure 8 show danger zone scores for a defaulting 
bank. The bank fails because it scores points on a range of 
indicators, including the Tier 1 capital ratio indicator, but its weak 
liquidity position, captured in the second and third indicators, 
contributes to its failure. As such, it is clear that the inclusion 
20. Banks can be penalized under the second pillar of Basel II for not hedging 
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of danger zones in the framework makes banks more vulnerable. 
The results accord with reality in the sense that funding liquidity 
crises are triggered by a mixture of factors and can occur even if 
the bank is perceived to be solvent.
Figure 8. Danger Zone Scores for a Defaulting Bank
Source: Authors’ drawing.
Contributing to bank heterogeneity are bank-specific funding 
spreads that depend on bank ratings. A bank is more likely to be 
downgraded as profitability falls and its capital falls below target. 
This serves to raise its funding costs, hurting profits further and 
making the bank more vulnerable to subsequent default. We 
observe this feedback relationship in figure 9. The figure shows 
two distributions for bank rating changes at the end of the forecast 
horizon or at the point of default, relative to the initial rating. The 
total number of observations is therefore 500 simulations multiplied 
by ten banks. The light-shaded distribution is for scenarios in which 
the bank does not default, and the black-shaded distribution is for 
scenarios in which the bank defaults. As we expect, the default 
distribution has more of its mass at lower ratings than does the 
nondefault distribution.402 Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison
Figure 9. Rating Distribution: Cumulative Changea 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Bank scenarios for the twelfth quarter, relative to the initial distribution. Gray bars represent ratings for 
nondefaulting bank scenarios; black bars depict ratings for defaulting bank scenarios.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of total assets in the last 
quarter of the simulation and the average aggregate return on 
assets (RoA) over the whole horizon. These figures highlight 
the role of contagion in RAMSI. The distributions are bimodal, 
with a main peak associated with a healthy banking sector and a 
considerably smaller second peak in the left tail.21 This is a direct 
consequence of bankruptcy costs and, in particular, network and 
asset-side liquidity feedbacks: since fundamental defaults can 
generate contagion, extreme negative outcomes become relatively 
more likely beyond a certain threshold than moderate negative 
outcomes. This result captures a phenomenon that is commonly 
perceived as a key feature of financial risk. 
The extent to which there is contagion in simulations in the 
left tail is highlighted by the evolution of the danger zone points. 
For example, table 4 presents the build up of points for two other 
banks following the failure of the bank shown in figure 8. As 
already discussed, this bank (Bank 1) defaults in a fundamental 
sense because it receives a danger zone score greater than 35. 
Prior to the failure of Bank 1, Bank 2 only has a danger zone score 
of 26.5. However, it is perceived to be so similar to Bank 1 that 
it is tipped into default by this pure confidence effect. Contagion 
21. The bimodality is qualitatively robust and crucial feature of the model. See 
Alessandri and others (2009) for more discussion of this bimodality.403 Funding Liquidity Risk in a Quantitative Model of Systemic Stability
Figure 10. Total System Assets and Return on Assets
A. Total system assets: Final forecast quarter
B. Return on assets: Twelve-quarter mean
Source: Authors’ calculations.
then extends to Bank 3, which also suffers because of its perceived 
similarity to the failed banks. Moreover, the failure of Bank 2 
and the associated fire sale of its assets cause Bank 3 to incur 
significant interbank and mark-to-market losses that eat into its 
capital. Indeed, of all the banks in the network, Bank 3 suffers 
the greatest counterparty credit loss as a percentage of its Tier 1 
capital prior to the default of Bank 1 as a result of the failure of 
Bank 2. Both interbank and mark-to-market losses triggered by 
fire-sales are important sources of contagion. This process clearly 
illustrates how funding liquidity problems at one bank can spread 
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3. poliCy appliCaTions
The ultimate goal for RAMSI is to sharpen and add analytical 
rigor to the Bank of England’s risk assessment work. To be successful, 
the model must provide a well-grounded narrative of how potential 
risks may play out. And to improve external communication, it needs 
to use metrics that are familiar to supervisors and risk managers. 
This section assesses some channels through which improvements 
will transpire and highlights some further issues in using RAMSI 
for policy analysis.
—Fan charts: Aggregate and bank-specific fan charts will be 
developed for a wide variety of financial variables (including losses, 
lending, credit spreads, and so on).22 In producing fan charts, we 
face a potential trade-off. On the one hand, there are benefits from 
improving the accuracy of our fan charts by including additional 
sources of randomness to that arising from the BVAR, for example, 
from the PD equations and liquidity risk. Such a distribution is 
arguably more likely to resemble that produced by commercial banks’ 
own risk managers. On the other, increasing the number of sources 
of randomness greatly increases model run times and breaks the 
direct mapping from macroeconomic scenarios to outcomes, thus 
reducing the clarity of story-telling.
—Stress testing: RAMSI will be of particular use in providing 
model-based estimates of the impact of the risks highlighted in the 
Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report (FSR). It will also be 
useful for running stress tests on the stability of the banking system 
under different stress scenarios. Relative to traditional stress tests, 
RAMSI integrates more of the channels through which shocks 
could propagate and takes account of the contagion that may occur 
through interbank exposures, asset fire sales, funding liquidity, and 
macroeconomic feedbacks. Assessment of the second-round effects 
has been identified by Haldane (2009) as an important area for 
development of stress testing in the financial system.
—Assessing sources of risk to banks: RAMSI will provide the 
relative contributions to overall risk of the various modules (credit 
22. RAMSI’s outputs may be used to provide alternative metrics of financial 
stability by recalibrating the reinvestment rule. To gauge declines in credit supply, 
it would be necessary to specify a reinvestment rule in which banks respond to losses 
by taking defensive actions, including reducing loans. Conversely, suppressing such 
mitigating actions would be a sensible option for assessing the potential for individual 
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risk, market risk, funding risk, interest income risk, and other 
risks). In particular, RAMSI may be used to assess the contribution 
of systemic feedbacks to overall risk.
—Intermediate outputs: A number of RAMSI’s outputs may be 
useful analytical tools, even when used in isolation from the rest of 
RAMSI. Examples include balance sheets, the credit loss model, the 
net interest income model, the ratings model, and the danger zone 
scores for funding liquidity crises.
—Policy  design:  RAMSI  can  be  used  for  counterfactual 
experiments in which regulatory changes could affect systemic risk.23 
For example, we could analyze regulations that require banks to 
hold more capital or liquid assets or to vary their holdings across 
the cycle. The impact on risk and profitability can be observed on 
either a bank-by-bank or an aggregate basis. The modular approach 
also affords the possibility of measuring the potential benefits of 
diversification for each bank.
—Recapitalization: RAMSI could be used to calibrate the extent 
to which the recent recapitalization of the U.K. banking system 
reduces systemic risk.
4. ConClusion anD fuRTheR woRk
This paper incorporates funding liquidity risk into a quantitative 
model of systemic stability. By applying the model to the U.K. 
banking system based on the balance sheet vulnerabilities that 
existed at the end of 2007, we demonstrate how rising funding 
costs and liquidity concerns can amplify other sources of risk. The 
unified modeling approach sheds light on risks arising throughout 
banks’ balance sheets. It also demonstrates how defaulting financial 
institutions may cause contagion by triggering default cascades 
through the interbank market; the sale of assets at fire-sale prices; 
and through the erosion of confidence in other banks. 
We intend to develop the model in a number of areas. A 
substantial area for further work is to analyze banks’ cash flow 
constraints and consider how defensive actions in the face of funding 
23. See, for example, Goodhart (2008). Procyclicality will, to some extent, be built 
into the baseline of RAMSI when we introduce Basel II dynamic risk weights, which 
adjust to changes in the probability of defaults. In addition to the regulatory experiments 
above, RAMSI can allow for the possibility of procyclicality in terms of profits being 
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stress may affect the rest of the financial system and the wider 
macroeconomy. In principle, macroeconomic feedbacks could be 
introduced by linking the realized banking-sector lending response 
to the price and quantity of loans in the BVAR, though we need to 
do more work to determine a coherent framework for embedding this 
important transmission channel. A further area for development will 
be to introduce more sources of randomness in the model beyond the 
BVAR (for example, in PDs). Such developments would clearly add 
to the computational complexity of RAMSI, but they would improve 
the realism of the various fan chart summaries of outcomes.
RAMSI has been one of the largest analytical projects at the 
Bank of England, and it will go live in 2009. Ultimately, its future 
development will largely be determined by the aspects of RAMSI 
that the Bank of England finds most useful in enhancing its 
understanding and communication of financial vulnerabilities. Our 
hope is that the analytical framework RAMSI provides will become 
central to the analysis of systemic risk in the United Kingdom and 
perhaps in other countries, as well.408 Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison
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